Niki Aimable Niyikiza
Founder of Tenuo and Security Engineer at Snap. ~10 years of infrastructure-security experience prior to Tenuo, with stops at Google, Datadog, and Snap. Speaks publicly on capability-based authorization for AI agents — the position that identity-based authorization gives agents ambient authority, which is structurally the wrong primitive for multi-agent flows that delegate and reason at run time. His proposed answer is the Tenuo Warrant (see Tenuo Warrant): cryptographic, task-scoped, holder-bound, offline-verifiable, delegation-aware capability artifacts that monotonically attenuate across hops.
Talks tracked here
- Capability-Based Authorization for AI Agents — Warrants That Survive Prompt Injection — [un]prompted Conference, San Francisco, March 4, 2026, Stage 2 Lecture 03.
What he argues
The four-layer stack everyone builds (Identity / Policy Engines / Model Guardrails / Sandbox) has no primitive for delegation-aware authorization at execution time. When Agent A hands work to Agent B, no existing layer can verify that B’s authority came from A, that scope narrowed at the hop, or that the task justified the access. Capabilities — specifically the Tenuo Warrant — fill that hole. Critically, capabilities don’t prevent prompt injection; they constrain what an injected agent can do, which is the right shape for runtime containment.
Notable framings
- “Identity-based auth treats all three the same” — intended action, hallucinated action, injected action. The system has no basis to distinguish.
- The valet-key analogy — a master key (ambient authority) vs a geo-fenced, speed-capped, time-bound, glove-box-disabled valet key (derived authority).
- “The map is not the territory” — constraint design (path normalization, URL canonicalization, OS sandbox guards) matters more than the cryptography. Real CVEs (CVE-2024-3571 LangChain, CVE-2025-3046 LlamaIndex, CVE-2025-61784 LlamaFactory, CVE-2025-66032 Claude Code allowlist) validate the failure mode.
- “The blast radius is frozen” — even a fully-compromised sub-agent cannot exceed what its parent’s warrant granted.
Cross-references
- Founder: Tenuo (Rust core + Python bindings; open source at
github.com/tenuo-ai/tenuo) - Current employer: Snap
- Companion talk same day: Bullen — Breaking the Lethal Trifecta — different angle (egress + tool annotations) on the same containment problem
- Cited as a “Tier 1” target speaker on [[unprompted-march-2026-talks-vs-ra-cmm|the [un]prompted mapping page]]
Open public traces
- Personal site:
niyikiza.com(referenced for the map vs territory writeup) - Tenuo:
tenuo.ai(playground for decoding live warrants);github.com/tenuo-ai/tenuo(open-source Rust core) - Email (per slide 12):
niki@tenuo.ai