MITRE ATLAS
MITRE ATLAS (Adversarial Threat Landscape for Artificial-Intelligence Systems) is a knowledge base of adversarial tactics and techniques targeting machine learning systems, structured in the same format as MITRE ATT&CK. As of version 5.4.0, it covers 84 techniques, 16 tactics, 56 sub-techniques, 32 mitigations, and 42 case studies.
Structure
ATLAS uses the ATT&CK-style structure: techniques are organized by tactic (the adversary goal), with sub-techniques providing additional specificity. Mitigations are linked to techniques. Case studies document real-world incidents with technique mappings.
Key tactic categories include: Reconnaissance, Resource Development, Initial Access, ML Attack Staging, Exfiltration, and Impact.
Q1 2026 Developments
ATLAS had the most rapid agentic threat coverage expansion of any framework — 18 new techniques in one quarter.
v5.3.0 (January 2026) — Techniques contributed by Zenity Labs:
- AI Service API exploitation
- AI Agent Clickbait (browser manipulation)
- Credential harvesting from agent tools
- SesameOp case study (AML.CS0042): OpenAI Assistants API backdoor use for command and control
- Three new case studies covering MCP server compromises and malicious AI agent deployment
v5.4.0 (February 2026):
- “Publish Poisoned AI Agent Tool” — supply chain attack technique
- “Escape to Host” — container/sandbox escape via agent tool execution
OpenClaw Investigation (February 9, 2026):
- Dedicated investigation report identifying 7 new techniques unique to the OpenClaw campaign
- Includes CVE-2026-25253
- Case study AML.CS0050 (Exposed OpenClaw Control Interfaces)
Cross-mapping to OWASP ASI Top 10 now covers all 10 of 10 categories.
Data quality caveat
ATLAS version numbers (v5.3.0, v5.4.0) and exact technique counts are primarily sourced from Vectra AI (a commercial vendor) rather than MITRE’s official changelog. Independently verify exact counts from atlas.mitre.org.
Strengths
- ATT&CK-style structure enables integration with existing SOC workflows and threat modeling tools
- Most rapid agentic threat coverage expansion of any framework
- OpenClaw Investigation demonstrates valuable rapid-response threat intelligence capability
- Arsenal CALDERA plugin supports automated red team exercise integration (though shows no major 2026 updates)
- Cross-maps to OWASP ASI Top 10 across all 10 categories
Gaps and Shortcomings
- Exclusively adversary-centric — catalogs attack techniques but provides no defensive control specifications
- Mitigations (32) are descriptive rather than prescriptive; none include implementation details, evidence criteria, or testing procedures
- Does not address non-adversarial AI failures, safety issues, or governance
- No incident response playbooks, IoCs, or forensic guidance
- Arsenal CALDERA plugin shows no major 2026 updates; still relies on Microsoft Counterfit library
- Coverage of cascading failures (ASI08) is absent
Coverage Against OWASP ASI Top 10
| ASI Category | Coverage |
|---|---|
| ASI01: Agent Goal Hijack | ● Specific techniques |
| ASI02: Tool Misuse | ● Specific techniques |
| ASI03: Identity & Privilege | ◐ Partial |
| ASI04: Supply Chain | ● Specific techniques |
| ASI05: Data Disclosure | ◐ Partial |
| ASI06: Memory Poisoning | ● AML.T0080 confirmed in-wild |
| ASI07: Insecure Inter-Agent | ◐ Partial |
| ASI08: Cascading Failures | ○ None |
| ASI09: Missing Guardrails | ○ None |
| ASI10: Rogue Agents | ◐ Partial |
Key Techniques (Agentic Focus)
- AML.T0080 — AI Agent Context Poisoning: Memory (confirmed in-the-wild February 2026 by Microsoft)
- “Publish Poisoned AI Agent Tool” — supply chain attack via marketplace
- “Escape to Host” — sandbox/container escape
- AI Service API exploitation, credential harvesting from agent tools
See Also
- MITRE (publisher)
- OWASP Top 10 for Agentic Applications (ASI Top 10) — cross-mapped to ATLAS; complementary risk taxonomy
- Agentic AI Security Capability Maturity Model — A 2026 Practical Proposal — ATLAS techniques anchor:
T1612/T0051/T0054→ D4 Runtime;T1565/T0080(Memory Poisoning) → D6 Data;T0019/ v5.4.0 “Publish Poisoned AI Agent Tool” /AML.CS0050→ D8 Supply Chain; ID-tagged evidence required at L3+ - NIST AI Risk Management Framework (AI RMF) — governance complement; ATLAS provides the threat intelligence NIST lacks